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After the Napoleonic Wars, the British stock market was dominated by government debt 
securities, and only a few companies had their shares traded on the market. One century later, 
at the onset of World War I, the equity market had become a global one with over 4,000 
companies having their equity listed on the London and various provincial stock exchanges. 
Scholarship to date has focussed on the performance, size, organisational structure, 
ownership structure and investor base in this market (Acheson et al., 2017; Foreman & 
Hannah, 2012; Grossman, 2002, 2015; Michie, 1999; Rutterford et al., 2011; Rutterford & 
Maltby, 2006, 2007). However, we know very little about how actively shares were traded on 
this market and the factors that affected the trading of shares. This paper aims to shed some 
light on this issue by looking at the trading of the shares of a major insurance company over 
the 1882-1920 period. 
 Share trading activity or share tradability is anything but an arcane subject.
1
 The 
tradability of shares in modern capital markets is viewed as a vital characteristic of financial 
systems, because it enables investors to liquidate and diversify their assets at a low cost 
(Bhide, 1993; Chordia et al., 2001; Woodward, 1985). This, in turn, creates incentives for 
companies and entrepreneurs to invest in long-run projects, which increases productivity, 
and, ultimately economic growth (Levine & Zervos, 1998; Rousseau, 2009). However, too 
much trading may have a deleterious effect on corporate governance by giving rise to very 
diffuse ownership, passive investing and high shareholder turnover (Bhide, 1993; Kay, 2012). 
                                                          
1
 We use the terms ‘trading activity’ and ‘share tradability’ rather than ‘liquidity’ because there are many 
aspects to liquidity and we only capture some of these - the ones which were most pertinent to investors at the 
time. Although trading activity and liquidity are generally related, low trading activity is not necessarily 
indicative of low liquidity, and measures of trading activity and liquidity typically have different determinants 




From an historical perspective, share tradability may have been the main rationale for 
the creation of the company organisational form and its widespread adoption in the second 
half of the nineteenth century (Ekelund & Tollison, 1980, 1983). Indeed, opposition to share 
transferability had held up the legal development of the company in the UK (Cooke, 1950; 
Harris, 2000). Given the alleged importance of this feature, it would be insightful to know the 
frequency with which investors in the past traded their ownership stakes.     
 One of the major changes in the British equity market during the 1882-1920 period 
was the move of unoccupied males and women into the market (Acheson et al., 2017; 
Jeffreys, 1946; Rutterford et al., 2011; Green & Owens, 2003; Newton & Cottrell, 2006; 
Rutterford et al., 2011; Rutterford & Maltby, 2006, 2007). Because nearly all of the women 
who entered the stock market at this time lived off the income from their investments, we 
classify them, as well as unoccupied males, as rentiers. This influenced the types of securities 
companies offered shareholders, share denomination, and their dividend policy (Acheson, 
Turner, & Ye, 2012; Campbell & Turner, 2011; Jeffreys, 1946, 1977; Rutterford et al., 2011). 
In this paper, we ask whether the rise of rentiers also affected share tradability. Jefferys 
(1946, 1977) argues that marketability made shares attractive to the new breed of middle-
class investors who emerged in the 1880s. However, these middle-class rentiers may have 
been buy-and-hold investors who held a diversified portfolio and subsequently traded 
infrequently, with the result that trading activity was dampened by the emergence of this new 
breed of investor. Notably, Chavaz & Flandreau (2017) suggest that there was a close 
connection between the liquidity of colonial government bonds and the types of investors in 
such bonds. We therefore investigate in this paper whether, in the instance of our case-study 
company, the rise of rentiers adversely affected share trading activity.  
 As well as enabling us to see how the rise of rentiers affected share tradability, our 
dataset enables us to explore how share trading activity was affected by the closure of the UK 
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stock market between 31 July 1914 until 4 January 1915, and the limitations on trading for 
the rest of the War. Our case study helps us understand for the very first time how share 
trading in the UK was affected during World War I.  
 To explore the above issues, we use the Share Transfer Books of the North British and 
Mercantile Insurance Company (NBMIC), which was one of the largest insurance companies 
traded on the UK stock market in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These 
transfer books record details on the buyer, seller, number of shares transferred, and price of 
each transfer in the company’s shares.  
 This rich dataset allows us not only to explore the trading of NBMIC shares, but it 
also enables us to see the socio-occupational status of buyers and sellers, so that we can 
observe the flow of investors in and out of the company’s shares. Furthermore, the share 
transfer books record when a shareholder died. Using probate records, we are able to 
determine the proportion of their wealth portfolio which was invested in NBMIC shares, thus 
revealing additional information on the types of investors in this market.   
The NBMIC was ranked the 30
th





 Apart from the large railways, the NBMIC had a similar number of 
shareholders in 1911 (c.5,000) to the average company in the top 300 largest companies 
(c.6,300) (Foreman-Peck & Hannah, 2012, online appendix). How representative is the 
NBMIC of share trading in this era? Are we able to generalise from this case study to the 
broader stock market? Our case study of the NBMIC provides generalisable insights for other 
large companies into how the change in the composition of a shareholder constituency affects 
tradability and the effects of the closure of the stock exchange during World War I.  
However, in terms of levels and, perhaps fluctuations, of tradability, we suspect that 
the NBMIC may not be representative of many non-insurance companies for three reasons. 
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 Based on data from Investor’s Monthly Manual. 
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First, as we document in this paper, insurance company shares were popular and became 
increasingly popular with long-term investors, which may have meant that their shares traded 
less than other companies which were not as attractive to buy-and-hold investors. Second, the 
uncalled capital attached to the shares may have meant that they traded less frequently 
(Acheson et al., 2012). Third, many insurance companies (the NBMIC included) had a 
greater separation of ownership from control, in that managers and directors owned a low 
proportion of company capital, than other types of companies, due to restrictions on the 
number of shares any one individual could own and graduated voting rules, which favoured 
small shareholders and discouraged the building of large ownership stakes (Acheson et al., 
2015, p.924; Hannah, 2007, pp.413-4).
3
    
We find that despite an increase in the number of shares in the late 1880s, share 
trading plateaus or diminishes over the period until just after World War I. Our evidence 
suggests that the change in the shareholder constituency towards buy-and-hold investors may 
help to explain this finding. We also find that trading still occurred during the World War I 
closure of the stock exchange, but at a much-reduced level. Overall, the war had a detrimental 
effect on the trading of shares. Finally, our study documents a large boom in insurance 
company stocks in 1919-20. This boom, which has not been studied by previous scholars, 
appears to have been driven by speculative fever and optimistic projections that the insurance 
sector’s post-war performance would continue.
4
 
This paper contributes to the historiography of British capital markets in several ways. 
First, it contributes to the literature which has identified the rise of women shareholders and 
the rise of rentier shareholders by examining the effect of this rise upon share trading. In a 
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 The voting scheme of the NBMIC was one vote for each share up to 10 shares, one for every additional five up 
to 100 shares, and one for every 10 beyond 100. 
4
 The only mention we can find to it is one sentence in Thomas (1973, p.248). 
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similar vein to this paper, Chavaz and Flandreau (2017) suggest that the rise of the clientele 
of rentiers reduced the liquidity of colonial and foreign bonds in the period 1880 to 1910. 
Second, it contributes to the literature which has examined the closure of the stock 
exchange during World War I. The extant literature focuses on how the City adjusted to its 
closure and the reasons for the closure (Michie, 1999; Roberts, 2013). However, we do not 
know how trading of company shares was affected and how companies and their shareholders 
coped with the closure. Silber (2005, 2007) has examined this very issue for the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE), but we know nothing about this issue from a UK perspective. 
Interestingly, Silber (2005, 2007) suggests that the closure of the NYSE had a limited effect 
upon share trading. Our case study suggests that this was not the case for the UK.  
Third, this paper contributes to the very thin literature that has examined share trading 
in the UK from an historical perspective (Acheson & Turner, 2008; Campbell, Ye & Turner, 
2017; Pitts, 1998). This literature has focused on the nineteenth century and has generally 
made inferences about tradability based on share returns and sticky share prices. Our study 
extends the time horizon by covering the period up to 1920 and looking in depth at the 
trading in the shares of one large company.    
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides some 
background regarding our case study and describes our data sources. Section three documents 
trading activity in NBMIC shares over the sample period. Section four investigates how the 
Stock Exchange closure in 1914 and World War I affected trading activity. Section five 
analyses how the changes in trading activity correlate with changes in the shareholder 






2. The case study and data sources 
The data for this study is taken from the Share Transfer Books of the North British and 
Mercantile Insurance Company (NBMIC). The North British Insurance Company (NBIC) 
was formed in 1809 in Edinburgh, with the aim to give Scotland a fire insurance firm that 
would rival those based in England (Raynes, 1964, p.227).  
The NBIC’s initial capitalisation was £500,000, with shares valued at £200, of which 
only £20 was paid when shareholders subscribed (NBMIC, 1909 p.59). It gained a Royal 
Charter in 1824, and over the next half-century it expanded by moving into life insurance, 
opening branches throughout Britain and the colonies, and taking over several smaller 
insurance firms (NBMIC, 1909). In 1862, the NBMIC was created as a result of a merger 
between the NBIC and the London-based Mercantile Fire Insurance Company, with capital of 
£2 million and 40,000 shares, and listed on both the Edinburgh and London stock exchanges 
(NBMIC, 1909, p.48; Supple, 1970, p.217).  
In September 1882, the company had a 2:1 stock split, with the result that it had 
80,000 shares with a nominal value of £25 and a par value of £6.25 per share. In April 1883, 
the company issued 20,000 additional shares to fortify their position (NBMIC AGM Minutes, 
1883). Then in 1889, the acquisition of the Scottish Provincial Assurance company was 
facilitated by the issuance of a further 10,000 shares (NBMIC. 1909, p.59). For the rest of our 
sample period, the NBMIC’s capitalisation remained at 110,000 shares.
 
Throughout our 
sample period, the nominal value of NBMIC’s shares was £25 and their paid-up value also 
remained constant at £6.25.  
As can be seen from Table 1, by the beginning of the twentieth century, the NBMIC 
was a large and profitable firm within a mature insurance sector. Its size meant that it could 
survive large pay-outs, such as the 1906 San Francisco earthquake, which cost the firm 
£666,083, equivalent to 24 per cent of its total market capitalisation (Bankers’ Magazine, 
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1907, July, p.101). Table 1 also reveals that the company was able to pay a high and (slowly) 
increasing dividend from the 1890s onwards, which no doubt would have made it popular 
with rentiers.  
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
Over our sample period, the average annual total return (capital gains plus dividend 
yield) on NBMIC shares was 6.4 per cent, which was very attractive for an investment which 
would have been perceived as a blue-chip company. By way of comparison, government 
consols, the traditional investment of rentiers, had an average annual total return of 1.1 per 
cent over this same period.
5
 The returns on NBMIC shares were also attractive relative to the 
average annual total return on corporate debentures and the overall equity market of 3.7 and 
5.7 per cent respectively.
6
    
The share transfer books of the NBMIC contain a substantial amount of detail, such as 
the seller’s and buyer’s name, address and occupation; the number of shares traded; and the 
price of the shares traded. A notation of ‘no price’ or ‘nominal’ was used when shares were 
transferred from a deceased person to the executors of their will, when shares were 
transferred from executors to other individuals, or when shares were transferred as inter vivos 
gifts.
7
 This type of transaction is excluded from our analysis of share trading. 
                                                          
5
 Based on data collected from the annual Statistical Abstract for the United Kingdom for 1882-1913 and 
Dimson et al. (2010) for 1914-1920. 
6
 The returns on the equity market are based on data collected from Grossman (2002) for 1882-1913 and 
Dimson et al. (2010) for 1914-1920. The debenture returns are from Coyle & Turner (2013). 
7
 We cannot be certain if the price recorded was a bid, ask or a midpoint price. Indeed, a transaction price may 
not even fall within the spread if it is stale. When we cross-referenced our prices with the Stock Exchange Daily 
Official List, we were unable to tell what our prices represented because the bid-ask price recorded was from 
one point in the day, which did not necessarily correspond to when the share was actually sold in the day.  
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The earliest surviving transfer books date from 1 November 1882 in Aviva’s archives. 
Like most UK companies, Aviva operates a 100-year policy in order to protect personal 
information. However, Aviva’s archivist kindly gave us permission to access books through 
until 31 December 1920. Digitisation of the transfer books created a database of 33,850 
individual transfers. Share prices were recorded for 8,131 days out of a possible 13,940, equal 
to 58.3 per cent; and for 7,935 trading days (Monday to Saturday) out of a possible 11,949, 
equal to 66.4 per cent. A small discrepancy arises due to 196 trades occurring on a Sunday, 
which suggests a small market outside of the normal business week.  
 In order to compare the performance of NBMIC shares against the wider insurance 
market, a total returns index was constructed for NBMIC shares (based on end-of-month 
values) and the UK insurance sector between 1882 and 1922. To construct the insurance 
market index, monthly price and dividend information for all UK insurance firms was 
collected from the Investor’s Monthly Manual.
8
 The performance of the NBMIC compared to 
the insurance market index is shown in Figure 1. The NBMIC begins to outperform the 
insurance market index from 1884 until the early 1890s, when it experiences a rapid decline. 
Both indexes then follow a similar pattern through until 1910, when the overall insurance 
sector index begins to outperform the NBMIC. This trend continues throughout the war, 
although both the insurance market and NBMIC follow a similar pattern. The insurance 
sector significantly outperforms the overall equity market from 1918 onwards. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
Using the NBMIC share registers at the beginning and end of our time period, we are 
able to reconstruct the list of shareholders and their ownership for 1882 and 1921. As can be 
seen from Table 2, between 1882 and 1921, the number of shares increased from 80,000 to 
110,000, and the number of shareholders increased from 1,210 to 5,526. This led to the 
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 Using the database created by the ICF at Yale School of Management. 
10  
 
average proportion of shares held by a shareholder falling from 0.08 per cent to 0.02 per cent, 
suggesting a greater dispersion in ownership.
9
 This increase in ownership dispersion is 
reflected in the percentage held by the top five, ten and twenty shareholders falling by more 
than half between 1882 and 1921, while the percentage held by the single (twenty) largest 
shareholder fell from 2.93 (21.22) per cent in 1882 to 0.95 (9.55) per cent in 1921. From 
these measures of the ownership structure of the NBMIC, we can conclude that there was a 
substantial increase in ownership dispersion over the four decades of our analysis.  
As a point of comparison, Acheson et al. (2015, p.920) report that for the average 
public company in their late-nineteenth-century sample, the percentage of shares owned by 
the largest and top twenty shareholders was 10.5 and 47.2 per cent. Acheson et al.’s (2015) 
equivalent figures for the top 350 UK firms in 2013 were 17.5 and 72.5 per cent. This 
suggests that the ownership of the NBMIC was very diffuse both from historical and modern 
perspectives.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
3. Trading of NBMIC shares 
Because ownership dispersion and the number of shareholders increased over our sample 
period, we hypothesise ceteris parabus that there should have been an increase in trading 
activity.
10
 Furthermore, given that our sample covers a period when the UK capital market 
was growing both in size and value (Grossman, 2002), we have an additional reason to expect 
trading activity to increase over time.  
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 There was already c.5000 shareholders by 1911. See Foreman-Peck and Hannah (2012, online appendix). 
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The literature on trading activity in financial markets uses share volume, number of 
trades and number of trading days to measure trading activity (Lo & Wang, 2000). In this 
paper, we use these three measures. Our two main measures are (1) share turnover, which is 
the volume of shares traded as a percentage of total outstanding shares and (2) trade 
frequency, which is the number of trades as a percentage of total outstanding shares. Both 
measures of trading activity are calculated for trading days (Monday to Saturday), and take 
into account new shares being issued. Our third measure is an inactivity measure from 
Lesmond et al. (1999) and is the proportion of trading days when no trades took place. This 
does not mean that jobbers on the stock market did not quote a bid-ask spread; it simply 
means that no trade occurred in that day. If our hypothesis of increased share trading holds, 
then we would expect trading activity to increase over time, as measured by share turnover 
and trade frequency, while a fall in the proportion of days when no trades took place should 
also be apparent.    
 Monthly trading activity is shown in Figure 2. Monthly trade frequency is given in 
Panel A, with an average of 0.06 per cent, while Panel B gives monthly share turnover, with 
an average of 0.47 per cent. There is substantial month-to-month variation in both measures. 
Spikes in trade frequency and share turnover occur throughout. However, trade frequency 
remains below 0.05 per cent for most months, and similarly share turnover remains below 
0.50 per cent. Both measures present a picture of trading activity remaining flat over time, 
where the only notable change was a decrease during World War I, and a dramatic increase in 
the post-war period. 
 [INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
The average monthly share turnover of 0.47 per cent for the NBMIC can be compared 
to modern-day markets, albeit with the obvious limitation that the NBMIC is only a single 
company. Trading activity in NBMIC shares was much lower than for modern markets. 
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Between 1995 and 2001, the average monthly share turnover for the FTSE-100 was 11.2 per 
cent, and for the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) it was 3.7 per cent (Dey, 2005). This 
suggests that trading activity was relatively low at the turn of the twentieth century compared 
to today. 
In terms of monthly movements in trading activity, we examine the years in which the 
NBMIC experienced a loss on its underwriting business to see if the months in which this 
loss was announced had unusual trading activity. As can be seen from the final column of 
Table 1, there are five years where this is the case - 1892, 1893, 1901, 1906 and 1917.
11
 
Losses in 1892 and 1893 were not directly attributable to any large single events – the AGM 
minutes make reference to an increase in small fires, with losses in Liverpool and the United 
States in 1892, and losses in France, Austria and the United States in 1893. As can be seen 
from Table 1, the losses in 1892 and 1893 are accompanied by the largest dividend cuts in 
our sample period. Losses in 1901 also do not seem to be directly attributable to any large 
event. The publication of these results does not appear to have adversely affected share 
trading activity. 
The largest annual loss in our sample period was in 1906, the year of the San 
Francisco earthquake. Along with a number of other British insurance companies, the 
NBMIC was directly exposed to this catastrophe.
12
 In the days following the disaster, there 
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 During our sample period, these years also rank as the top five years by loss rate on the Fire account (total 
losses/ total premiums) - 68, 73, 69, 81 and 67 per cent respectively. The average loss rate of the Fire business 
over our sample period was 58 per cent. 
12
 The fall in stock prices two days after the earthquake, as reported by the Financial Times (1906, April 21, 
p.5), were as follows: Atlas (20 per cent); Commercial Union (10 per cent); Liverpool and London and Globe 
(17 per cent); London (18 per cent); London and Lancashire Fire (19 per cent); NBMIC (10 per cent); Northern 
(5 per cent); Norwich Union (2 per cent); Phoenix (23 per cent); Royal (21 per cent); Royal Exchange (5 per 
cent); Sun (14 per cent); Union (14 per cent). 
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was considerable speculation in the financial press as to the total potential liabilities and 
losses amongst British insurance companies. At its AGM on the 11 May 1906, the Chairman 
announced that the NBMIC would be able to meet its commitments without drawing on its 
fire reserve fund (NBMIC AGM Minutes, 1906).
13
 During May 1906, there was a small, but 
notable increase in trading frequency (see Figure 3).  However, any increase in activity 
appears to have been short-lived with share trading returning to normal levels very quickly. 
The final major insurance loss was in 1917 on account of the Salonika fire on 18 
August 1917, when a small fire developed into a serious conflagration because of limited 
water supply as a consequence of a large number of allied troops in the Greek city.  From the 
perspective of the NBMIC, it produced very severe losses of about £1 million (Trebilcock, 
1985, p.391), which ranked ahead of the losses incurred in 1906. Despite the size of the loss, 
this episode did not have any noticeable effect on the trading of NBMIC shares.   
Our other measure of share trading, the proportion of trading days per year when no 
trades took place, is calculated on an annual basis and shown in Figure 3. While there was a 
high percentage of trading days with no trades at the beginning of the 1880s, this rapidly fell, 
and generally remained between 30 and 35 per cent through until 1897. A step change 
appears in 1898, with the proportion of days with no trades increasing to 45 per cent, 
followed by a slow fall to 35 per cent prior to 1914. World War I saw an increase in 
inactivity, with a high in 1916 of 65 per cent, before returning to the pre-war level in 1918. 
The period after World War I witnesses the number of trading days with no trades falling 
dramatically, to beneath 20 per cent in both 1919 and 1920. However, overall, there is no 
consistent increase in trading activity until after the war. In terms of modern stock markets, it 
is common for many stocks not to trade for days or weeks (Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara, & 
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 The final pay-out by the NBMIC to policyholders was £666,083, which is reflected in the 1906 accounts 
which were published in 1907 (Bankers’ Magazine, 1907, July, p.101). 
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Paperman, 1996, p.1405). However, if the NMBIC is representative of other large diffusely-
owned companies in the pre-1920 era, trade will have occurred every week, but only on four 
of the six trading days.   
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]  
When shareholders died and their shares were not passed on to their heirs, the 
executors of the estate sold the shares on the open market. To what extent did the death of 
shareholders drive trading activity and does this vary over time? On average, 28.2 per cent of 
annual trade frequency and 31.2 per cent of annual share turnover was due to sales arising out 
of the death of shareholders each year, and there is little variation across the years of our 
sample. Therefore, trading activity and changes in trading activity were primarily driven by 
normal sales. 
The main finding which emerges from the above is that there was no increase in 
trading activity over our sample period, despite a substantial increase in the number of 
shareholders and ownership diffusion as well as a general growth in the overall equity 
market. This is something of a puzzle. The second finding which has emerged from the 
analysis above is that there was a dramatic increase in share trading in 1919 and 1920, which 
cannot be explained by new capital being issued or a stock split. In sections four and five, we 
will attempt to explain these two puzzles.  
 
4. Trading activity, stock exchange closure and World War I 
The London Stock Exchange announced its closure for the first time in its history on 31 July 
1914. After learning that war was inevitable, the decision to close the exchange was taken by 
the Stock Exchange Committee in order to prevent panic and widespread failures (Michie, 
1999, p.145). The closure of foreign bourses and the postponement of settlement had made 
debts due to London Stock Exchange members from foreign clients irrecoverable. In 
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addition, as members of the stock exchange financed so much of their operations on credit, 
the situation was exacerbated by falling security prices. It was feared that banks would 
increase the margin cover required on loans or call in loans altogether, which would lead to 
the immediate failure of a large number of exchange members (Keynes, 1914; Michie, 1999; 
Roberts, 2013).  
Despite the closure of the exchange, J. M. Keynes (1914) stated that unofficial 
transactions in cash took place by 13 or 14 August, or possibly earlier. Our dataset shows that 
trades in NBMIC shares took place on each day from 4 to 14 August 1914, amounting to 196 
shares across 31 trades. During the closure of the stock exchange, trading generally took 
place in Throgmorton Street, and was therefore subject to the elements. Adverse weather 
typically led to a lower attendance of stock exchange members and reduced business 
(Western Mail, 1914, Aug. 27; Financial Times, 1914, Sept. 12). Alternatively, some 
business was done under the archways of Shorter’s Court and in the entrance to Drapers’ 
Gardens (Financial Times, 1914, Sept. 12). Trading also took place in brokers’ offices or 
other convenient meeting places; Durlachers, the jobbers, dealt in the shares of rubber 
plantation companies at the Savoy hotel (Michie, 1999, p.147). However, these attempts to 
transact business outside the stock exchange were suppressed to a great extent, and by the end 
of August dealings had ‘practically come to a standstill’ (Financial Times, 1914, Aug. 25, 
p.1). The Stock Exchange Committee actively discouraged dealings for cash in the street on 
the grounds that they may have the effect of ‘unduly depreciating values’, and therefore 
defeated the purpose of the exchange closure (Western Mail, 1914, Aug. 27, p.8). Members 
of the public who did not sell shares were described as ‘supporting the stock exchange’ and 
‘patriotic’ (Financial Times, 1914, Sept. 3, p.1), whereas jobbers who sold Consols were 
depicted as irresponsible, and, ‘coming from outside financial houses with German 
connections, whose object is to attack British credit’ (Financial Times, 1914, Sept. 4, p.1). 
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The reduction in activity is reflected in our dataset with just eight trades taking place from 15 
to 31 August 1914, with no trades occurring on six of these trading days. 
During the stock exchange closure, there was also use of the Exchange Telegraph’s 
‘challenge system’ to facilitate trading. It had previously been used for only the most inactive 
securities (Michie, 1999, p.147). Subscribers to the challenge system broadcasted security 
prices over the telegraph and waited for a response. First advertised on 1 September 1914, 
this method of trading was also met with opposition. Jobbers petitioned the committee to 
cancel the use of the challenge system stating that it, too, defeated the object for which the 
stock exchange was closed and facilitated dealings at ‘knock-out’ prices (Financial Times, 
1914, Sept. 3; Financial Times, 1914, Sept. 5, p.1). By September 8, no business was done on 
the challenge system. 
Auctions of securities also appeared, especially on behalf of solicitors, who had 
difficulty in valuing or settling estates (Michie, 1999, p.147). These auctions were advertised 
by circular in early September 1914 (Financial Times, 1914, Sept. 9), yet these, too, were 
condemned in the financial press as they would also ‘defeat the efforts of the stock exchange 
commission to prevent undue depreciation’ (Financial Times, 1914, Sept. 10, p.1). Just 11 
trades in NBMIC shares took place in September 1914; five of these were trades by executors 
of wills, accounting for over 70 per cent of share turnover. 
By November 1914, a number of provincial stock exchanges were conducting 
informal sessions, and NYSE officially reopened in December (Michie, 1999, p.147). On 4 
January 1915, the London Stock Exchange reopened after over five months of closure. 
During its closure, 111 trades in NBMIC shares took place with a total share volume of 
1,205. Comparing these figures to the same period during the previous year, the total number 
of trades in NBMIC shares fell by 58.1 per cent, and the total volume of NBMIC shares 
traded on the market fell by 52.2 per cent.  
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While the closure of the NYSE had a limited effect on trading in New York (Silber, 
2005, 2007), the fact that trading also continued in London but on a much-reduced scale is 
informative. The two markets had significant structural differences that may have made 
London less adaptable to street trading following the exchange’s closure. There was already 
very active street trading taking place outside the NYSE before WW1, known as the Curb 
Market (Sobel, 1970, O’Sullivan, 2007). This was not the case with the London Stock 
Exchange. In addition, NYSE brokers were also permitted to act as dealers, and vice versa, 
which is likely to have made the transition to trading outside the exchange much easier. 
Again, this was not the case on the London Stock Exchange, where there was strict separation 
of the roles of dealer and broker (Hirst, 1911, p.110).   
Despite the reopening of the exchange, severe restrictions on trading remained in 
place throughout the war. These included a shortened trading day from 11am to 3pm, 
minimum price levels, and cash only transactions with immediate payment. The use of 
options was banned, as was arbitrage, while the passing of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 
1914 meant non-UK investors could not sell their holdings.
14
 These restrictions were mostly 
maintained for the duration of World War I, although limited relaxation of the rules on non-
UK investors took place in 1915 (Michie, 1999, pp.148-150). As can be seen from Figure 2, 
the months after August 1914 up until late 1917 were the most inactive months in our sample 
period in terms of share trading. Figures 2 and 3 suggest that 1915, 1916 and 1917 were the 
most inactive years in our sample period. The war and its restrictions on official trading had a 
demonstrable effect upon share trading.     
                                                          
14
 Because virtually no non-UK investors held shares in the NBMIC, this Act would have had no effect on the 
trading of its shares. 
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Interestingly, the end of the war is associated with a remarkable boom in the price and 
trading of NBMIC shares.
15
 As can be seen from Figure 1, this boom in NBMIC shares was 
reflected in the wider insurance sector. Why did it occur? The war provided significant 
opportunities for British insurance companies.
16
 Insurance companies by and large emerged 
from the war in a stronger financial position than when they had entered (Clayton, 1971). 
Losses in continental Europe were offset by gains in the North American market, which came 
largely with the entry of the United States into the War in 1917 and the cessation of enemy 
insurance activities in the United States (Clayton, 1971, pp. 151-2). Total premium income 
from fire business increased by 95 per cent for British insurers between 1915 and 1920.
17
 
Table 1 shows that the business of the NBMIC grew substantially from 1917 onwards. 
The headline of the Financial Times Insurance Supplement in April 1920 described 
1919 as ‘a remarkable year: business booming and profits substantial’ (p.7). In addition, it 
noted that the expansion of operations, the removal/ reduction of uncalled capital, and the 
introduction of share splits which improved the marketability of stock, were all contributing 
factors behind the recent growth in prices. However, the broadly positive article included a 
number of cautionary notes; specifically, that fire companies would not do so well as in 1918-
19, the pressure of taxation would remain burdensome, and the inrush of new undertakings 
would increase competition markedly. A follow-up piece in the Financial Times (1920, July 
9, p.8) referenced Savory’s Insurance Share Annual, noting that three things would contribute 
to the diminution in insurance share prices: (a) the diversion of funds to new capital issues of 
                                                          
15
 There was a boom in new issues in 1919 and boom in activity for popular industrials (Thomas, 1973, p. 247). 
16
 The Financial Times (1918, April 5, p.5) in its annual insurance supplement stated that ‘if the war has 
imposed considerable hardships and immensely increased the responsibilities of insurance companies, it has also 
afforded them many new opportunities for advancing their status and enlarging their sphere of operations’. See 
also Supple (1970, pp.413-427). 
17
 Calculations are based on figures quoted in Clayton (1971, pp. 151-2). 
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existing insurance companies and the creation of a large number of new companies, (b) a 
reduction in profits in 1919 as a consequence working expenses and taxation, and (c) an 
expectation that insurance losses would rise when the process of deflation began. This 
prediction duly happened, with insurance share prices and NBMIC trading activity falling 
back to normal levels by 1920. 
 
5. The investor base and share trading 
In section 3, we saw that the trading activity in NBMIC shares plateaued despite an increase 
in share issuance and an increase in ownership diffusion. This is something of a puzzle 
because an increased share issue and increased ownership dispersion would usually result in 
an increase in share trading activity. Then, after World War I, there was a huge jump in 
trading activity despite there being no change in share issuance. One possible explanation for 
the plateau in trading activity was that there was a change in the shareholder constituency 
over the time period, whereby shares were increasingly held by long-term buy-and-hold 
investors, who were much less likely to trade shares on a frequent basis. Jefferys (1946, 
1977) argues that a new breed of middle-class investors emerged in the 1880s. These 
investors were pure rentiers who were uninterested in firm governance and were very much 
focussed on the dividends paid by such stocks. The rise of this middle-class rentier after the 
1870s has been documented in a series of recent studies, with a particular focus on the rise of 
female shareholders (Acheson et al., 2017; Green & Owens, 2003; Newton & Cottrell, 2006; 
Rutterford et al., 2011; Rutterford & Maltby, 2006, 2007). Maltby and Rutherford (2006) 
found that female investors were long-term holders of their investments, while Green, 
Owens, Maltby & Rutterford (2009) argue that female investors were most concerned with a 
steady income stream. A higher proportion of female investors would therefore be expected 
to affect trading activity, because these rentier investors would buy and hold NBMIC shares 
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to receive income rather than seeking profits from capital appreciation. This would ultimately 
suppress trading activity. 
 A further change in the shareholder base which could have affected trading activity is 
that there could have been an increase in the home bias of NBMIC investors. Home bias 
exists in modern equity markets, with investors having a preference for the equity of 
companies located in close proximity (Coval & Moskowitz, 1999, 2001). Home bias also 
existed in the UK equity market in the era of this study (Campbell & Turner, 2011; Cottrell 
1980, pp.90-3; Franks, Mayer, & Rossi, 2009; Rutterford et al., 2017). This bias may have 
existed because of information asymmetries or behavioural biases which overweight the 
familiar.  Irrespective of the reason for the presence of home bias, if the flow of investors into 
and out of a firm’s shares is in part determined by geographic proximity, this would limit the 
potential pool of investors who participate in the market, which restrains trading activity. 
Therefore, an increase in the home bias present in those investing in the NBMIC shares may 
explain why trading activity failed to change substantially over our time period.  
 The Share Transfer Books record the socio-occupational status of sellers and buyers 
of NBMIC shares. All women are identified as widows, spinsters or wives. The occupations 
of nearly one half of all men are blank, which could suggest that they are rentiers or 
gentlemen or simply that their occupation was not recorded. In order to see if the NBMIC’s 
shareholder constituency became more skewed towards buy-and-hold investors, we use the 
net change in shares held by female shareholders as a proxy. We also look at the net change 
of shares held by financial professionals who were not designated as executors or trustees in 
the NBMIC’s share transfer books (e.g., stockbrokers, bankers and actuaries).  We do so for 
two reasons. First, these investors were less likely to be buy-and-hold investors. Second, we 
want to see if some of our trading patterns can be explained by trading by such investors. 
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 Figure 4 shows the cumulative change in the NBMIC’s investor base over our sample 
period. Two things are worthy of comment. First, the plateau in trading activity which we 
observe from the mid-1890s onwards corresponds to the growth in shares held by female 
investors. Thus, the growth in the number of stereotypical buy-and-hold investors coincides 
with the stalling and decline in trading activity. Second, the rapid increase in trading activity 
after World War I coincides with a substantial decline in the shares held by women and an 
increase in shares held by financial professionals. The rapid price increases in 1919 appear to 
have been so large as to induce women shareholders to abandon their buy-and-hold strategy 
and sell their shares. Indeed, the falling dividend yield on the shares due to the increasing 
price may have been a strong sell signal to buy-and-hold investors who preferred steady 
yields. Financial professionals, not inexperienced investors, were those buying shares during 
the market frenzy.    
  [INSERT FIGURE 4] 
To gain further insight into the investors in NBMIC shares during this era, we utilise a 
feature of the share transfer books which enable us to identify when a shareholder died. Using 
the shareholder’s name and address, we searched probate records available on Ancestry.co.uk 
to obtain the value of the deceased shareholder’s probated estate.
18
 Using this approach, we 
located the wealth of 562 shareholders. Table 3 reports the probated wealth of NBMIC 
shareholders as well as the proportion of their wealth invested in NBMIC shares at time of 
death.  
[INSERT TABLE 3] 
                                                          
18
 Prior to 1898, the probated estate value only included unsettled personalty i.e., property other than land such 
as stocks and shares.  From 1898, unsettled realty (i.e., land) was also included in the value of estates.  From 
1926, settled realty is also included in the value of estates. 
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From Table 3, we can see that over the time period there was a trend towards less 
wealthy (relatively speaking) shareholders in the NBMIC. This is consistent with the rise of 
the middle-class investor. We can also see that the median shareholder had 4.9 per cent of 
their wealth in the NBMIC shares when they died and the distribution of probated wealth in 
NBMIC shares did not change much over time.
19
 Given that nearly 50 per cent of the average 
individual’s probated wealth in this era consisted of shares and government securities 
(Rutterford et al., 2011, p.180), it appears that the median NBMIC shareholder had about 
one-tenth of their financial portfolio in NBMIC shares. This evidence is consistent with the 
idea that the holders of NBMIC shares were part of the new breed of middle-class investors 
holding a diversified portfolio.    
 In order to see if the home bias of investors changed over the period and potentially 
affected the trading of shares, we examine the cumulative change in the location of 
shareholders. Figure 5 focuses on the four major cities where NBMIC shareholders lived, two 
of which were operational headquarters and the main stock markets where the company’s 
shares were traded according to the Investor’s Monthly Manual and Stock Exchange 
Yearbook (i.e., London and Edinburgh), and then everywhere else.
20
 Figure 5 shows that the 
shares held in London dropped over our sample period, but this was counterbalanced by an 
increase in shares being owned by Liverpudlians and investors living elsewhere in the UK. In 
addition, there was a slight reduction in the number of shares being held by investors in 
Edinburgh. Notably, the two cities which experienced falls in the number of shares being 
                                                          
19
 Rutterford & Sotiropoulos (2016) analyse portfolio holdings across 263 male and 245 female investors in the 
last three decades of the nineteenth century, and they found that male and female investors had 7.8 per cent and 
16.6 per cent respectively of their wealth invested in a single security.   
20
 This, of course, is not to say that their shares were not listed on other provincial stock exchanges. However, 
the Stock Exchange Yearbooks and Investor’s Monthly Manual report that London and Edinburgh were the two 
markets where NBMIC shares were chiefly traded. 
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owned by investors living in them, were the two cities where the firm was headquartered and 
where NBMIC shares were chiefly traded. In other words, instead of there being an increase 
in home bias, there was a reduction in it, with investors coming from further afield. Thus, we 
cannot attribute the stagnation in trading to an increase in home bias and consequently 
smaller pool of investors.  
[INSERT FIGURE 5] 
 Figure 5 also reveals a remarkable change in the residence of shareholders after 1918, 
which coincided with the substantial jump in share trading in 1919. First, there was a 
substantial drop in the number of shares being held by Edinburgh residents, but an increase in 
shares held by Glaswegians and Londoners. The rise of Londoners is consistent with the 
increased interest in NBMIC shares from financial professionals. However, the rise of 
Glasgow and fall of Edinburgh may suggest that investors living closest to the company’s 
headquarters got out when the price was high.   
 
6. Conclusions 
Using a hand-collected dataset, we examine the share trading in one of the largest UK 
insurance companies over the period 1882 to 1920. We have three main findings. First, 
despite an increase in capital, shareholder numbers and ownership diffusion, we find that 
share trading activity did not increase over our sample period. Our evidence suggests that the 
entrance of rentiers into the shareholding constituency coincides with this dampening of share 
trading. This is somewhat ironic given that the marketability of equity was one of its features 
which attracted rentiers in the first place. This finding has major implications for our 
understanding of the development of the UK equity market and corporate governance. 
Further research should examine the effect of the entrance of rentiers on the rise of the UK’s 
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corporate economy and financial markets. In particular, was reduced tradability a price worth 
paying for better corporate governance and a stable shareholder constituency? 
 The second major finding is that trading of NBMIC shares still occurred during the 
closure of the Stock Exchange in 1914, but on a much-reduced scale. A further novel finding 
is that there was a boom in share trading and in insurance shares after World War I. Future 
scholarship should examine the extent of this stock-market boom in other sectors and the role 
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Figure 1. NBMIC performance versus UK insurance market (monthly), Nov 1882- Dec 1922 
Sources: See text. 
Notes: The insurance sector index is calculated from the monthly total returns of ordinary shares of all insurance companies 
listed in the Investor’s Monthly Manual (IMM) and weighted by market capitalization. The equity market index is calculated 
from the total returns of all common equities in the IMM weighted by market capitalization. The index of NBMIC returns is 
calculated using the price of the final trade of the month in the company shares from Nov 1882-Dec 1920 and using the final 
price of the month listed in the IMM for Jan. 1921 to Dec. 1922 inclusive. All returns are adjusted for stock splits and share 




























































































































































Figure 2. Monthly trading activity of NBMIC shares, 1882-1920 
Sources: see text. 
Notes: The solid black line represents a 12-month moving average of monthly trading. Monthly share turnover is the number 
of shares traded each month as a percentage of total outstanding shares. Monthly trade frequency is the number of 
transactions each month as a percentage of total outstanding shares. Both measures of trading activity are calculated for 













































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3. Annual percentage of days with no trades in NBMIC shares, 1883-1920 
Sources: see text. 
Notes: This measure is the number of trading days in the year where there is no trading activity divided by the total number 











































































































































































Figure 4. The cumulative change in the number of NBMIC shares held by women, males and finance 
professionals, 1882-1920 
Sources: see text. 
Notes: The above data are stock measures which capture the net change in the socio-occupational make-up of 



















































































































































Figure 5. The cumulative change in the number of NBMIC shares held by residents of London, Edinburgh, 
Glasgow, Liverpool and elsewhere, 1882-1920 
Sources: see text. 
Notes: The above data are stock measures which capture the net change in the geographical distribution of the 




























































































































































Fire Life & 
Annuity 
Fire Life & 
Annuity 
Fire Fire  
1881 3,763 2,042 399 959 334 626 - 2.00 
1882 3,812 2,305 441 1,087 278 678 49 2.00 
1883 3,967 2,613 392 1,108 398 673 82 1.25 
1884 4,086 2,629 416 1,114 358 704 71 1.50 
1885 3,792 2,734 415 1,149 364 615 167 1.50 
1886 4,329 2,771 429 1,143 357 617 150 2.25 
1887 4,534 2,839 477 1,190 361 667 176 1.75 
1888 4,753 2,909 526 1,282 415 736 110 1.75 
1889 6,693 3,382 617 1,270 419 711 166 1.75 
1890 7,021 3,419 729 1,389 566 811 96 2.00 
1891 7,291 3,405 814 1,442 619 871 62 2.38 
1892 7,775 3,366 917 1,467 659 998 -20 1.50 
1893 8,221 3,355 914 1,447 660 1,050 -71 1.00 
1894 8,712 3,431 1,023 1,441 680 828 140 1.00 
1895 9,445 3,586 1,216 1,478 774 873 114 1.25 
1896 9,793 3,656 1,027 1,464 760 796 187 2.13 
1897 10,290 3,775 986 1,434 713 810 151 1.50 
1898 10,712 3,800 1,008 1,424 905 854 83 1.50 
1899 11,168 3,792 1,088 1,447 886 930 16 1.50 
1900 11,468 3,871 975 1,547 926 972 10 1.50 
1901 12,526 3,823 1,110 1,624 956 1,116 -83 1.73 
1902 13,077 3,984 1,167 1,866 963 980 164 1.73 
1903 13,404 4,179 1,111 1,820 1,084 937 287 1.73 
1904 13,677 4,141 1,111 1,938 1,108 1,273 177 1.73 
1905 14,099 4,519 1,178 1,940 1,039 971 324 1.73 
1906 14,418 4,163 1,281 2,064 1,041 1,678 -364* 1.78 
1907 14,922 4,330 1,285 2,158 1,128 1,113 289 1.78 
1908 15,274 5,022 1,237 2,107 1,255 1,173 227 1.78 
1909 15,767 5,299 1,300 2,193 1,219 1,096 308 1.78 
1910 16,093 6,351 1,325 2,209 1,183 1,102 324 1.78 
1911 16,391 6,970 1,337 2,379 1,162 1,349 70 2.00 
1912 17,022 7,049 1,426 2,436 1,167 1,285 250 2.00 
1913 17,766 7,111 1,435 2,478 1,169 1,353 194 2.00 
1914 18,287 7,102 1,445 2,146 1,350 1,408 10 2.00 
1915 18,784 7,364 1,376 2,147 1,467 1,097 217 2.00 
1916 19,037 7,449 1,318 2,355 1,431 1,229 161 2.00 
1917 19,146 8,039 1,297 2,856 1,517 1,917 -217 2.00 
1918 19,685 8,159 1,537 3,083 1,365 1,500 355 2.00 
1919 20,431 8,911 1,775 3,649 1,383 1,561 440 2.00 
Sources: North British and Mercantile Insurance Co. Ltd. Annual Financial Statements. (1881-1919). Annual financial 
statements (CU2700-2). Aviva Archives, Norwich, UK. 
Notes: The figures above are based on published accounts. The NBMIC may have smoothed its profits as happened in the 
banking sector (Capie & Billings, 2001). The Asset Base, Premiums and Claims have been consolidated across the life and 
annuity accounts. We have excluded the Accident, Marine and Art businesses from the above table, because NBMIC 
maintained separate balance sheets following their inception / acquisition in 1908 and 1917 respectively. The position of 
profit or loss on the Revenue account is before the inclusion of any interest and dividend income from investments.  






































Top 5 shareholders 8,364 10.41 2.08 
 
4,202 3.99 0.8 
Top 10 shareholders 11,982 14.92 1.49 
 
6,831 6.48 0.65 
Top 20 shareholders 17,050 21.22 1.06 
 
10,064 9.55 0.48 
All Shareholders 80,000 100 0.08   110,000 100 0.02 
Sources: North British and Mercantile Insurance Co. Ltd. Register of Shareholders. (c.1862-1921). Register of 
Shareholders [North of Humber and Mersey, 1904-1921, Vols. 1 and 2, Register of Shareholders South of Humber and 
Mersey, 1909-1921, and Register of Shareholders Resident London and Edinburgh, 1862-1885.] 
(CU2934,35,38,39,42,43,55 and 56). Aviva Archives, Norwich UK. 
Notes: The NBMIC had northern and southern shareholder registers. Over time, these volumes differed in chronology, 
which did not make it for easy to do a cross-sectional analysis of shareholders at one point in time.  In order to get a 
cross-sectional look at shareholders in 1882 and 1921, we utilised the stock splits which occurred in those years and 






Table 3. Portfolios and wealth of deceased NBMIC shareholders, 1884-1920 
 
Proportion of probated wealth in NBMIC 
shares (%) 









1884-1889 4.6 2.0 11.3 39,054 9,873 169,379 
1890-1894 7.8 2.6 14.7 17,125 7,243 91,784 
1895-1899 5.4 3.1 13.0 17,956 7,522 56,322 
1900-1904 4.7 1.7 11.4 17,196 6,322 52,058 
1905-1909 5.0 2.0 9.9 18,969 4,250 56,906 
1910-1914 4.7 1.9 7.9 10,664 4,170 80,402 
1915-1920 3.9 1.7 11.1 10,257 3,734 43,776 
1884-1920 4.9 1.9 10.9 15,805 5,136 70,709 
Sources: see text. 
Notes: We use the market value of NBMIC shares at death and divide this by the probate value of the entire estate. Probated 
wealth of deceased shareholders is unadjusted for inflation. 
 
